Getting Data In

Drop Windows Event Logs with EventID 5156 and not RFC 1918

rtalcik
Path Finder

HI All,

   So i wrote this in attempt to reject all RFC1918  TO RFC1918 logs for windows event logs with WID 5156.  basically log anything external but not internal to internal communication.  The sample log is a sniplet of what i am trying to drop.

 

 

Props.conf

 

 

[WinEventLog:Security]
TRANSFORMS-sec = WinEventCode5156Drop,WinEventCodeSecDrop,WinEventCodeSecPass

 

 

 

 

Transforms.conf  (Is order of operations my issue here?)

 

 

[WinEventCode5156Drop]
REGEX=((EventCode(?:\S+)5156)[\s\S]*(((((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+10\.))|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+172\.1[6-9])|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+172\.2[0-9])|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+172\.3[0-1])|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+127\.0\.0\.1)|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+192\.168))[\s\S]*((((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+10\.)|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+172\.1[6-9])|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+172\.2[0-9])|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+172\.3[0-1])|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+127\.0\.0\.1)|(((?:Source Address|Destination Address)(?:\S+))(?:\s)+192\.168)))
DEST_KEY = queue
FORMAT = nullQueue


[WinEventCodeSecDrop]
REGEX = .
DEST_KEY = queue
FORMAT = nullQueue



[WinEventCodeSecPass]
REGEX=(?:^EventCode=|<EventID>)(4618|4649|4719|4765|4766|4794|4897|4964|5124|550|1102|4621|4675|4692|4693|4706|4713|4714|4715|4716|4724|4727|4735|4737|4739|4754|4755|4764|4764|480|4816|4865|4866|4867|4868|4870|4882|4885|4890|4892|4896|4906|4907|4908|4912|4960|4961|4962|4963|4965|4976|4977|4978|4983|4984|5027|5028|5029|5030|5035|5037|5038|5120|5121|5122|5123|5376|5377|5453|5480|5483|5484|5485|6145|6273|6274|6275|6276|6277|6278|6279|6280|640|619|24586|24592|24593|2454|4608|4609|4610|4611|4612|4614|4615|4616|4622|4624|4625|4634|4646|4647|4648|4650|4651|4652|4653|4654|4655|4656|4657|4658|4659|4660|4661|4662|4663|4664|4665|4666|4667|4668|4670|4671|4672|4673|4674|4688|4689|4690|4691|4694|4695|4696|4697|4698|4699|4700|4701|4702|4704|4705|4707|4709|4710|4711|712|4717|4718|4720|4722|4723|4725|4726|4728|4729|4730|4731|4732|4733|4734|4738|4740|4741|4742|4743|4744|4745|4746|4747|4748|4749|4750|4751|4752|473|4756|4757|4758|4759|4760|4761|4762|4767|4768|4769|4770|4771|4772|4774|4775|4776|4777|4778|4779|4781|4782|4783|4784|4785|4786|4787|4788|4789|4790|4793|4800|4801|4802|4803|4864|4869|4871|4872|4873|4874|4875|4876|4877|4878|4879|4880|4881|4883|4884|4886|4887|4888|4889|4891|4893|4894|4895|4898|902|4904|4905|4909|4910|4928|4929|4930|4931|4932|4933|4934|4935|4936|4937|4944|4945|4946|4947|4948|4949|4950|4951|4952|4953|4954|4956|4957|4958|499|4980|4981|4982|4985|5024|5025|5031|5032|5033|5034|5039|5040|5041|5042|5043|5044|5045|5046|5047|5048|5050|5051|5056|5057|5058|5059|5060|5061|5062|5063|5064|5065|5066|5067|5068|5069|5070|5125|5126|5127|5136|5137|5138|5139|5140|5141|5152|5153|5154|5155|5156|5157|5158|5159|5378|5440|5441|5442|443|5444|5446|5447|5448|5449|5450|5451|5452|5456|5457|5458|5459|5460|5461|5462|5463|5464|5465|5466|5467|5468|5471|5472|5473|5474|5477|5479|5632|5633|5712|5888|5889|5890|608|6144|6272|561|563|625|613|614|615|616|24577|24578|24579|24580|24581|24582|24583|24584|24588|24595|24621|5049|5478)
DEST_KEY = queue
FORMAT = indexQueue 

 

 

 

I can't figure out why this isn't working.

 

 

 

Sample Log

 

 

10/21/2021 10:06:05 AM
LogName=Security
SourceName=Microsoft Windows security auditing.
EventCode=5156
EventType=0
Type=Information
ComputerName= (REDACTED BY ME THE POSTER)
TaskCategory=Filtering Platform Connection
OpCode=Info
RecordNumber=7865970185
Keywords=Audit Success
Message=The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.

Application Information:
	Process ID:		1548
	Application Name:	\device\harddiskvolume4\windows\system32\dns.exe

Network Information:
	Direction:		Inbound
Source Address:                 10.10.211.7
	Source Port:		53
Destination Address:            10.1.0.0
	Destination Port:       57834
	Protocol:		17

Filter Information:
	Filter Run-Time ID:	90427
	Layer Name:		Receive/Accept
	Layer Run-Time ID:	44

 

 

 

Labels (4)
0 Karma

PickleRick
SplunkTrust
SplunkTrust

Ouch.

1. I'd go for blacklisting events at the source forwarder as @isoutamo already hinted. It's way closer to source and it saves you a lot of bandwidth and CPU downstream.

2. If possible, use XML formatted windows events.

3. As far as I remember, modern windows inputs by default set sourcetype as just WinEventLog or XMLWinEventLog. The channels are specified in the source field, not in the sourcetype. So your whole props stanza will not match.

4. Yes, order of operations does matter but yours is pretty OK. (but the WinEventCode5156Drop transform is pointless since next you're setting all events' queue to nullQueue).

0 Karma

isoutamo
SplunkTrust
SplunkTrust
I think that currently it is used XMLWinEventLog at least that is used on those nodes which I can check now.
0 Karma

isoutamo
SplunkTrust
SplunkTrust
Based on your example and REGEX this should work. See https://regex101.com/r/puu59N/1 .
Probably what you get from windows to Splunk is somehow different and for that reason it didn't match to your regex.
r. Ismo
0 Karma

woody188
New Member

Use "blacklist" in the inputs.conf instead.

0 Karma
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